

Revisiting Atomic Patterns for Scalar Multiplications on Elliptic Curves

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Oberthur Technologies Crypto Group

Cardis 2013

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Elliptic Curve Background
- 3 Side-Channel Analysis
 - Simple Power Attack
 - State-of-the-Art Countermeasures
- 4 Our Contribution
- 5 Conclusion

Discrete Log Problem (DLP)

Given two elements G, P of a cyclic group, find a scalar k such that:

$$\underbrace{G + \dots + G}_{k \text{ times}} = [k]G = P$$

- DLP is assumed to be a hard problem
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is based on this problem
- ECC implementations must not reveal secret scalars

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


Short Weierstrass equation

$$p > 3, \quad \{a, b\} \subset \mathbb{F}_p, \quad 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0.$$

$$(\mathcal{E}) : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b.$$

$(\mathcal{E}(\mathbb{F}_p) \cup \mathcal{O}, +)$ abelian group.

Elliptic Curve Group Law



Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

$$[k_0]P$$

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

$$[k_0]P + [k_1]2P$$

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

$$[k]P = [k_0]P + [k_1]2P + \dots + [k_{\ell-1}]2^{\ell-1}P$$

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

$$[k_{\ell-1}]P$$

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

$$2([k_{\ell-1}]P) + [k_{\ell-2}]P$$

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

$$[k]P = 2(\dots 2(2([k_{\ell-1}]P) + [k_{\ell-2}]P) + \dots) + [k_0]P$$

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

- A doubling is performed for every scanned bit

Right-to-Left Evaluation ◀

Left-to-Right Evaluation ▶

- A doubling is performed for every scanned bit
- An addition is performed only for non-zero bit

- Pre/Post-computations
- RAM consumption
- Reduce the number of doublings and additions

Window Techniques ◀▶

Straus-Shamir Trick ▶

Sparse Representations ◀▶

Window Techniques ◀▶

$$k : k_{\ell-1} \quad \dots \quad k_5 \quad k_4 \quad k_3 \quad k_2 \quad k_1 \quad k_0$$

Straus-Shamir Trick ▶

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Window Techniques ◀▶

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$$k: \begin{array}{ccccccc} k_{\ell-1} & k_{\ell-2} & k_{\ell-3} & \dots & k_{\ell/2} \\ k_{\ell/2-1} & k_{\ell/2-2} & k_{\ell/2-3} & \dots & k_0 \end{array}$$

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Window Techniques ◀▶

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Sparse Representations ◀▶

Window Techniques ◀▶

Straus-Shamir Trick ▶

Sparse Representations ◀▶

Aim at increasing zero digits with the help of negative digits:

0xF7 : 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1

Window Techniques ◀▶

Straus-Shamir Trick ▶

Sparse Representations ◀▶

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
0xF7 : 1 0 0 0 0 1̄ 0 0 1̄

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
Scalar multiplication



Scalar multiplication



- The secret scalar k can be recovered



- Operation flow independent of the secret
- Exemples: Double and Add Always, Montgomery Ladder, . . .

Scalar multiplication




- Introduced by Chevallier-Mames, Ciet, Joye [2003]
- One sequence of operations in \mathbb{F}_p .

■ [Multiplication
Addition
Negation
Addition]

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- One sequence of operations in \mathbb{F}_p .
- Use this sequence with different operands.



■ $\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{Multiplication} \\ \text{Addition} \\ \text{Negation} \\ \text{Addition} \end{array} \right.$

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- One sequence of operations in \mathbb{F}_p .
- Use this sequence with different operands.




Chevallier-Mames et al. EC Operations

Doubling:	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■	$10M + 20A + 10N$
Addition:	■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■	$16M + 32A + 16N$


 \implies

 $2M + 3A + 2N$
Longa

Longa EC Operations ▶





[2007]

Doubling: 
 $8M + 12A + 8N$

Addition: 
 $14M + 21A + 14N$


Giraud-Verneuil EC Operations ◀

[Cardis2010]

	⇒		$2M + 3A + 2N$	Longa
	⇒		$2S + 6M + 10A$	Giraud-Verneuil

Longa EC Operations ▶


[2007]


Doubling:  $8M + 12A + 8N$

Addition:  $14M + 21A + 14N$

Giraud-Verneuil EC Operations ◀

[Cardis2010]

Doubling:  $2S + 6M + 10A$

Addition:  $4S + 12M + 20A$

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How to Improve Patterns?

- More operations in a pattern \implies less dummy operations.



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Doubling:		10M
Addition:		11M

How to Improve Patterns?





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Doubling:  11M \implies 

Addition:  11M \implies 





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Doubling:		10M	\implies	
Addition:		10M	\implies	

How to Improve Patterns?

- More operations in a pattern \implies less dummy operations.
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Doubling:		9M	\implies	
Addition:		9M	\implies	

All Curve Pattern ▶

Doubling: ■ $3S + 8M + 9A$

Addition: ■ $3S + 8M + 9A$

Most Curve Pattern ▶

Doubling: ■ $2S + 8M + 10A$

Addition: ■ $2S + 8M + 10A$

$a = 0$ Curve Pattern ▶

Doubling: ■ $2S + 7M + 8A$

Addition: ■ $2S + 7M + 8A$

All Curve Pattern

This pattern can be used with all existing elliptic curves.

Most Curve Pattern

$a = 0$ Curve Pattern

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This pattern restricts the value $I^2 = -a3^{-1}$ to be a quadratic residue. Then we have:

$$3X^2 + aZ^4 = 3(X - IZ^2)(X + IZ^2)$$

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$a = 0$ Curve Pattern

For security and efficiency reasons, the curves with $a = 0$ have a dedicated pattern.


$[k]P$ for unknown P


- $\text{NAF}_{w=4}$
- ℓ doublings and $\ell/5$ additions


$[k]G$ for fixed point G


- Precompute $Q = [2^{\ell/2}]G$ once for all
- Split k and compute $[k]G = [k_0]G + [k_1]Q$
- JSF
- $\ell/2$ doublings and $\ell/4$ additions

bit size	192	224	256	320	384	512	521
A/M	0.21	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.16	0.14	0.14
GV A/M	0.30	0.25	0.22	0.16	0.13	0.09	0.09










Countermeasure Overhead



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- Optimizing additions rather than doublings is a valid strategy for secure implementation.
- First proposition for secure multi-multiplication.
- Most EC protocols can benefit from multi-multiplication implementations.